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Globalization and Standards:
The Logic of Two-Level Games
JANE K. WINN*
Abstract:
The emergence of a global information
architecture has fueled regulatory competition among
nations and regions to set information and communication
technology (“ICT”) standards. Such regulatory competition
can be thought of as a two level game: level one is
competition to set ICT standards within a nation or region;
level two is competition to set the global ICT standards with
reference to local standards. The United States and the
European Union are global leaders in setting ICT standards,
and compete to set global ICT standards based on different
local regulatory cultures: the U.S. is a “liberal market
economy” (“LME”) within which informal standard
developing processes are perceived as legitimate, while
formal standard developing processes are perceived as
legitimate within the “coordinated market economies”
(“CME”) that tend to dominate EU regulation. In recent
decades, informal ICT standard setting organizations
(“SDOs”) known as consortia, which are more narrowly
focused and less transparent than traditional SDOs have
emerged in the U.S. and have come to dominate global ICT
regulatory competition. Standards for Radio Frequency
Identifiers (“RFID”) provide an example that illustrates this
trend. EU regulators now are considering what changes may
be needed in the EU system of harmonizing standards and
EU regulation in order to reverse this trend. If EU regulators
succeed in engaging with selected ICT standards consortia,

* Charles I. Stone Professor and Faculty Director, Law, Technology & Arts Group,
University of Washington School of Law, Seattle, Washington. Special thanks to Peter
Shane for his patience.
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this might permit CME regulation to prevail over LME
regulation in competition to set global ICT standards.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Robert Putnam once observed that there had been few systematic
attempts to take account of the interaction between national strategies
in international arenas and domestic strategies within national
arenas. He further proposed the metaphor of the “two-level game” as a
framework for organizing the analysis of national and international
political dynamics simultaneously.1 For Putnam, Level I was the
international relations game, Level II was the domestic politics game,
and the goal was to achieve acceptable outcomes to international
relations challenges that were also acceptable outcomes within each of
the domestic political systems of the relevant players.2 This essay will
apply Putnam’s metaphor of the two-level game to the interaction
between national strategies to achieve international agreement on
technical standards that benefit domestic economic interests, and
domestic strategies to balance the competing interests of producers
and consumers with regard to the content of technical standards.3 In
the standards arena, global recognition of technical standards is the
Level I game, while domestic recognition of standards is the Level II
game.
In order to treat the adoption of technical standards as equivalent
to the outcome of international diplomacy or domestic political
processes, it is necessary to recognize the development and
implementation of standards as the outcome of political, economic,
Different governance structures for
and technical processes.4
1 Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42
INT’L ORG. 427, 436 (1988).
2

Id. at 436–37.

In order to distinguish industrial or engineering standards from legal standards or norms,
the former are referred to in this paper as “technical standards.” The International
Organization for Standardization has defined the former as:

3

A document, established by consensus and approved by a recognized body, that provides,
for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or their
results, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given context [and]
. . . be based on the consolidated results of science, technology and experience, and aimed
at the promotion of optimum community benefits. Standards and
RegulationsDefinitions, Int’l Org. for Standardization, Mar. 25, 2008,
http://www.standardsinfo.net/info/livelink/fetch/2000/148478/6301438/standards_reg
ulations.html.
SAMUEL KRISLOV, HOW NATIONS CHOOSE PRODUCT STANDARDS AND STANDARDS CHANGE
NATIONS 23–24 (University of Pittsburgh Press 1997). See generally ANTHONY OGUS,
4
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standard-developing institutions have emerged in different countries,
representing a wide range of approaches from markets, selfregulation, government regulation, and direct government control.5
The study of the political processes associated with the development
and diffusion of technical standards should therefore recognize that
the full range of options included in “new governance” analyses of
political institutions may be involved.6 In technical standards arenas,
the equivalent of a successful outcome in Putnam’s two-level game in
international relations would be the simultaneous voluntary adoption
of technical standards in both global and domestic markets in a
manner recognized as legitimate in both international and national
political processes.
As the impact of information and communications technologies
(“ICT”) on national and international economic activities grows,7 the
importance of ICT standards is also growing. While ICT standards
and SDOs share many features with traditional industrial economy
product standards and SDOs, they differ significantly in certain
respects.8 One of the most notable differences is the magnitude of the
externalities, or network effects, created by the need for
interoperability of different ICT systems and products, and the

REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY (Peter Cane et al. eds., Oxford
University Press 1994); ROGER BOUT, MARC BRUSCHI, MONIQUE LUBY & SYLVAINE POILLOTPERUZZETTO, LAMY DROIT ÉCONOMIQUE: CONCURRENCE, DISTRIBUTION, CONSOMMATION
(Wolters Kluwer France 2006).
Walter Mattli & Tim Büthe, Setting International Standards: Technological Rationality
or Primacy of Power?, 56 WORLD POL. 1, 3–4, 23, 25 (2003).

5

6 Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An
Introduction, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 18
(Lester M. Salamon ed., Oxford University Press 2002).

See Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Private Services-Producing
Sector Continued to Lead Growth in 2006, Jan. 29, 2008,
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/industry/gdpindustry/2008/gdpind06_rev.htm
(noting ICT producing-industries constitute less than 4% of the U.S. GDP, but account for
almost 15% of GDP growth).

7

See CARL CARGILL, OPEN SYSTEMS STANDARDIZATION: A BUSINESS APPROACH 118–19
(Prentice Hall 1996), (noting that formal SDOs normally have two major components: the
larger component is the volunteer committees made up of representatives of the
engineering discipline that will be served by the completed standard (usually called
working groups or technical committees), while the smaller component is the
administrative section that manages meetings, tracks drafts, and administer voting
procedures).

8
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problem of high switching costs, or “lock-in.”9 In response to the
rapid pace of innovation in ICT markets and the large economic stakes
created when strong network effects are present, new forms of
informal private SDOs known as “consortia” or “fora” have emerged in
recent decades.10 Although in theory, informal ICT standards bodies
could be based in any developed market economy, as a practical
matter, most of the hundreds of consortia now operating have roots in
the U.S. economy.11 While ICT standards consortia in particular are
often more nimble and effective at navigating the treacherous straits
of global standards competition than more traditional SDOs, one
factor that often contributes to their greater agility is their lack of
transparency and public accountability relative to traditional SDOs.12
The development of standards is normally an integral element of
modern national political, economic and legal systems; the structure
of SDOs normally varies from country to country just as their political,

CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE
NETWORK ECONOMY 13, 104 (Harvard Business School Press 1999).
9

Carl Cargill, The Informal Versus the Formal Standards Development Process: Myth
and Reality, in STANDARDIZATION ESSENTIALS: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 257, 260 (Steven
M. Spivak & F. Cecil Brenner eds., Marcel Dekker, Inc. 2001) [hereinafter ESSENTIALS].

10

11 For example, in the October 2008 survey of ICT standards fora and consortia published
by the European Committee for Standardization (“CEN”), more than 90% of the 240
groups listed have roots in the U.S. See European Committee for Standardization, Survey
of Fora & Consortia, Oct. 2008,
http://www.cen.eu/cenorm/sectors/sectors/isss/consortia/survey+table+of+content.asp
(listing standards-related fora and consortia).
12 For example, traditional SDOs in the United States that have been accredited by the
American National Standards Institute (see infra note 53 and accompanying text) commit
to observe the “ANSI Essential Requirements: Due Process Requirements for American
National Standards” in their processes. These include Membership must be open to all
interested parties; the processes may not be dominated by a single party or interest group
and efforts should be made to maintain balance among participants; efforts to resolve
disputes should be undertaken in good faith, notices of standards activities must be
publicized in a manner likely to encourage the participation of all interested parties;
opinions of all participants, including dissenting opinions, must be considered before
standards are finalized; standards should be finalized based on evidence of consensus such
as voting; and an appeal process should be provided to challenge actions. See ANSI
ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS: DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR AMERICAN NATIONAL
STANDARDS 4 (2008) [hereinafter ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS],
http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents/Standards%20Activities/American%20Na
tional%20Standards/Procedures,%20Guides,%20and%20Forms/2008%20ANSI%20Esse
ntial%20Requirements/2008%20ANSI%20Essential%20Requirements%20031108.pdf.
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economic and legal systems vary.13 While the political consensus in
the U.S. generally favors more individualistic, market-oriented
institutional approaches to social issues, in many other developed
economies such as France, Germany, and Japan, the political
consensus generally favors a greater emphasis on social regulation
and government coordination. As a result, SDOs in the U.S. operate
largely outside any form of government oversight and focus intensely
on market conditions, while SDOs in more highly regulated economies
operate within a framework of government oversight and focus on
regulatory as well as market variables.14 As globalization increases the
interdependence and integration of what were formerly discrete
national institutions, these differences in national legal cultures open
the door to many new forms of regulatory competition.15
This article will focus on regulatory competition to set global ICT
standards. While not all ICT standards have an impact on human
behavior, many do have the effect of channeling behavior in particular
directions in much the same manner that law and other social norms
do. In recent decades, ICT standards developed by ICT SDOs with ties
to U.S. markets have generally enjoyed more success in global markets
than have those developed by SDOs with ties to other countries or
regions.16 This success is due to many factors, including the larger
scale of the ICT sector in the U.S. economy and the greater marketorientation of traditional American SDOs. Other factors include the
greater ability of consortia, a non-traditional form of SDO, to detect or
determine market trends, to remain narrowly focused on economic
Jay Tate, National Varieties of Standardization, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 442, 442–46 (Peter A. Hall &
David Soskice eds., Oxford University Press 2001); Ragnar E. Löfstedt & David Vogel, The
Changing Character of Regulation: A Comparison of Europe and the United States, 21
RISK ANALYSIS 399, 399 (2001).
13

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, GLOBAL STANDARDS: BUILDING BLOCKS
FOR THE FUTURE, TCT-512 14 (1992) [hereinafter GLOBAL STANDARDS: BUILDING BLOCKS
FOR THE FUTURE], www.strategicstandards.com/files/GlobalStandards.pdf.

14

See Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Introduction to REGULATORY COMPETITION AND
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES xix, xix–xi (Daniel C. Esty & Damien
Geradin eds., Oxford University Press 2001); William W. Bratton et al., Introduction:
Regulatory Competition and Institutional Evolution, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
COMPETITION AND COORDINATION 1, 1–7 (William W. Bratton et al. eds., Oxford University
Press 1996).
15

GREG FITZPATRICK, SWEDISH ICT COMMISSION, THE FAILURE OF EUROPEAN ICT
STANDARDS POLICY AND A POSSIBLE FUTURE? 10 (2003) [hereinafter SWEDISH ICT
COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN ICT STANDARDS], www.itkommissionen.se/doc/650.html.
16
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factors, and to deflect consideration of social factors in defining the
scope of their work. To the extent that ICT standards have the effect
of regulating human behavior, and to the extent that their content is
shaped by U.S. economic and legal institutions, the success of SDOs
with ties to the U.S. in achieving global adoptions of the standards
they produce may have the effect of exporting U.S. models of
regulation through the emerging global ICT architecture. Under
conditions of trade liberalization, individual end users of ICT products
and services located outside the U.S. may now have more
opportunities to defect from highly regulated local markets, and to opt
into global markets defined by U.S. ICT standards and weaker U.S.
regulatory standards. As trade liberalization advances, the process of
opening up local markets to products that incorporate ICT standards
has tended to fuel the adoption of standards developed by U.S. ICT
consortia based on the U.S. market-oriented approach to regulation.17
ICT standards developed by U.S.-based consortia may often be
available sooner, and be less expensive to adopt if they permit the
externalization of social costs, while ICT standards developed in more
heavily regulated markets outside the U.S. may often take longer to
finalize and be more expensive to adopt if they require that more
social costs be internalized.18
Switching the framework for analyzing these developments from
regulatory competition (which often produces zero-sum games) to
Putnam’s two-level game metaphor shifts the focus to a search for
outcomes that would be equally acceptable in societies with either
high or low levels of regulation. In applying the metaphor of a twolevel game in international relations, the goal is outcomes that are
recognized as legitimate within each national political system in
addition to producing a stable outcome at the international level. In
the ICT standards arena, the goal is both market adoption and
political legitimacy within each national economy as well as in
international trade.
This article will consider under what
circumstances regulatory competition to set global ICT standards
might be redirected toward building an institutional framework
17 Andrew Updegrove, Standards, Cycles and Evolution: Learning from the Past in a New
Era of Change, CONSORTIUMINFO.ORG (Consortium Standards Bulletin, Boston, Mass.),
May 2005, available at http://www.consortiuminfo.org/bulletins/may05.php.
18 For any given sector of the economy, there exists an empirical question as to whether the
regulatory framework in the U.S. or EU requires greater internalization of social costs or
risk minimization; in some economic sectors, the U.S. may be more proactive in regulating
certain risks than EU countries. See Jonathan B. Wiener & Michael D. Rogers, Comparing
Precaution in the United States and Europe, 5 J. OF RISK RES. 317, 319 (2002).
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perceived as legitimate within different national political orders,
supported by a multilateral consensus, and capable of producing
widely implemented standards. Of course, such a goal is a very tall
order, but it may not be as impractical as it may seem at first glance:
the basic outlines of such a framework may already exist in the Code
of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of
Standards contained in Annex 3 to the WTO Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade.19

II. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MODERN STANDARDS INSTITUTIONS
Standards play a pivotal role in both domestic and international
economic activity, yet are rarely studied from a social science
perspective.20 With regard to the role of standards in the U.S.
economy, where most standards are set by private-sector
organizations, the author of one of the few books on the political
economy of American standards setting noted “[t]he universe of
private standards is massive and mysterious.”21 The relevant data are
difficult if not impossible to collect, notwithstanding the formal
commitment of many public standard-developing organizations to
maintaining transparent processes. A recent EU study by industry
experts on standards developments related to radio frequency
identifiers found that:
access to information is variable . . . even within
different ISO committees. The quality of information
can certainly improve with insider knowledge that is
not generally available to the public. As the authors
have insider knowledge for some areas, and are

19

Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120, 138.

20 Tim Büthe, Current and Recent Research Projects and Papers on the Politics of
Standards, Regulations, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade, DUKE UNIVERSITY,
http://www.duke.edu/~buthe/research/standards_regulation.html (last visited May 23,
2009). Some notable exceptions exist. See ROSS E. CHEIT, SETTING SAFETY STANDARDS:
REGULATION IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS (University of California Press 1990);
MICHELLE P. EGAN, CONSTRUCTING A EUROPEAN MARKET: STANDARDS, REGULATION, AND
GOVERNANCE (Oxford University Press 2001); HARM SCHEPEL, THE CONSTITUTION OF
PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: PRODUCT STANDARDS IN THE REGULATION OF INTEGRATING
MARKETS (Hart Publishing 2005).
21

CHEIT, supra note 20, at 21.
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members of the public for others, this is reflected in the
quality of the analysis.22
In non-U.S. developed countries with a tradition of developing
their own national standards, a single dominant national standards
body (“NSB”) normally handles the work of standards developing.23
NSBs may be organized as private sector organizations or government
agencies.24 At the international level, the International Organization
for Standardization (“ISO”),25 the International Electrotechnical
Commission (“IEC”), and the International Telecommunications
Union (“ITU”), an agency of the United Nations, are recognized as de
jure international standards organizations. Countries designate the
standard developing body that will represent them in these
international bodies. NSBs established as government agencies
generally work closely with other government agencies in charge of
developing and executing national economic development strategies.26
In Europe, the work of NSBs is subject to EU law,27 and is coordinated
with the work of “European Standards Organizations” (“ESOs”)
including the European Committee for Standardization (“CEN”), the
European
Committee
for
Electrotechnical
Standardization
(“CENELEC”), and the European Telecommunications Standards
Institute (“ETSI”).28 The ESOs have made a formal commitment to
GLOBAL RFID FORUM FOR STANDARDS (GRIFS), D1.3 RFID STANDARDISATION STATE OF
THE ART REPORT– VERSION 1 110 (2008) [hereinafter GRIFS], http://www.grifs-

22

project.eu/data/File/GRIFS%20D1_3%20State%20of%20the%20Art%20Report.pdf.
Examples of such NSBs include the British Standards Institute (“BSI”), Association
Française de Normalisation (“AFNOR”), Deutsches Institut für Normung e. V. (“DIN”),
Japanese Industrial Standards Committee (“JISC”), and Standardization Administration of
China (“SAC”).

23

ALAN SYKES, PRODUCT STANDARDS FOR INTERNATIONALLY INTEGRATED GOODS MARKETS,
58–59 (Brookings Institution 1995).
24

25

N.B., the name ISO is a standard, not an acronym, so it is the same in all languages.

26 GLOBAL STANDARDS: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 14, at 61; Cargill,
The Informal Versus the Formal Standards Development Process: Myth and Reality,
supra note 10, at 22.

See, e.g., Council Resolution 85/C 136/01, 1985 O.J. (C 136) 1, 2 (establishing the “New
Approach” to European standardization).

27

28 Council Directive 98/34/EC, 1998 O.J. (L 204) (EP) (laying down a procedure for the
provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations and of rules on
Information Society Services.).
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cooperate with ISO and IEC; this commitment forms part of a
framework of coordination of standard setting that integrates the
work of European NSBs, ESOs and international SDOs.29 Even in
countries with a more public, centralized approach to standards
developing, social scientists studying regulation and government
economic policies may note the existence of NSBs; but they rarely
focus their attention directly on the political economy of NSBs
themselves.30
The decades following World War II have seen economic growth
unparalleled in history, and at the same time, economic
With
interdependence among nations has increased sharply.31
economic growth and increased trade, the role of technical standards
in cross-border trade has increased. The General Agreement on Trade
and Tariffs (“GATT”), established in 1947, and the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”), established in 1995, have contributed to an
enormous reduction to explicit barriers to international trade in the
form of quotas and tariffs. As explicit barriers have dropped,
however, the significance of implicit barriers in the form of
incompatible national standards has grown enormously.32 Under the
29 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION (ISO) & EUROPEAN COMMITTEE
FOR STANDARDIZATION (CEN), AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION BETWEEN ISO
AND CEN (VIENNA AGREEMENT),

http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/fetch/2000/2122/3146825/4229629/4230450/4230
458/01__Agreement_on_Technical_Cooperation_between_ISO_and_CEN__Vienna_Ag
reement_.pdf?nodeid=4230688&vernum=0 (last visited Feb. 25, 2009). See also Council
Resolution 2000/C 141/01, 2000 O.J. (C 141) 1, 3–4 (Paragraph 10 notes the importance of
emphasizing “the role of European standardisation as a means to meet specific needs of the
European market, to serve the public interest, in particular in support of European
policies, to provide standards in new domains, to implement international standards in a
coherent way and, while respecting the independence of national standards bodies, to
facilitate mutual understanding between Member States’ standards bodies and the
preparation of coherent positions in international standardisation.”)
30 Two notable exceptions are Egan and Schepel. EGAN, supra note 20; SCHEPEL, supra
note 20.

See generally Henry J. Aaron, et al., Preface to ALAN O. SYKES, PRODUCT STANDARDS FOR
INTERNATIONALLY INTEGRATED GOODS MARKETS (The Brookings Institution 1995);
INFLUENCING AND MEETING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS: CHALLENGES FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (International Trade Center 2003) [hereinafter INFLUENCING AND MEETING
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS].
31

ALAN O. SYKES, PRODUCT STANDARDS FOR INTERNATIONALLY INTEGRATED GOODS
MARKETS (The Brookings Institution 1995); INFLUENCING AND MEETING INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS: CHALLENGES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1 (International Trade Center
2003).
32
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General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (“GATT”), issues related to
standards and trade have been addressed by the voluntary GATT
Standards Code.33 Within the Uruguay Round of negotiations which
produced the WTO, obligations governing technical standards
changed from voluntary to mandatory under the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT Agreement”).34 As a result of the
growing impact of standards on trade in goods and under
international law, the role of standards in international trade has
attracted more academic attention.35 Such attention is dwarfed,
however, by the attention given to the WTO dispute settlement
system.36
Although it is never easy to explain “why the dog didn’t bark,”37 it
is possible to hazard some guesses as to why the political economy of
modern standards institutions remains nearly invisible to legal
academics and social scientists. Most participants in modern SDOs
have scientific or engineering backgrounds, and many of the issues
they resolve are highly technical in nature, making it difficult for social
scientists lacking a technical background to separate the technical
from political issues.38 In situations such as those where there are no
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (with Annexes), Apr. 12, 1979, 1186 U.N.T.S.
276.

33

34

See ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS, supra note 12, at 120.

35

See, e.g., SYKES, supra note 32.

For example, a 2002 bibliography of publications about the WTO dispute resolution
publication in English contained over 200 hundred entries. See Barbara Monroe, WTO
Dispute Settlement Procedure Bibliography, Dec. 2002,
www.law.georgetown.edu/iiel/research/projects/dsureview/documents/dsubib.doc;
However, in 2009, an online search for U.S. law review articles analyzing issues related to
WTO TBT agreement in depth turned up only 24 entries. Query– “WTO TBT,” WESTLAW,
www.westlaw.com (using the Journals & Law Reviews database, type in “WTO TBT”). A
leading trade law textbook over 1500 pages long omits coverage of the TBT altogether. See
Raj Bhala, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE (3d ed.,
LexisNexis 2008).

36

37 However, Sherlock Holmes did manage to discern why the dog did not bark in one
murder case (the murderer was the dog’s master). ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in
SHERLOCK HOLMES: THE COMPLETE NOVELS AND STORIES VOLUME I 455, 475 (Bantam
Books 1986).
38 In 1972, Laura Nader famously commented on a similar situation in anthropology.
Laura Nader, Up the Anthropologist: Perspectives Gained from Studying Up, in
REINVENTING ANTHROPOLOGY 284 (Dell Hymes ed., Pantheon Books 1972). She demanded
that more anthropologists should “study-up” (meaning study elite rather than oppressed
groups in society), but also ventured a guess as to why so few do: “anthropologists value
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incumbent technologies already on the market, it may be possible for
competitors to base decisions largely on technical variables with
minimal political conflict.
In other situations, however, the
participants in standard-setting processes understand very clearly the
distributional effects of different outcomes, and fight hard to advance
their private interests. While participants in standard-developing
processes may have a very sophisticated understanding of the politics
of standards setting, they have few incentives to write about their
understanding of those processes in the form of academic
commentary and to try to publish those commentaries in social
science journals. Non-participants may simply be unaware of the
magnitude of the political conflicts that technical personnel resolve
within standard-setting processes, or may mistakenly believe that
most issues can be resolved with reference to scientific rather than
political criteria. In-depth analyses of the politics of standard-setting
organizations by American legal academics have tended to focus on
the impact of antitrust or intellectual property law on the standards
they produce, rather than SDOs as institutions.39
The politics of ICT standards may be a slightly more glamorous
and visible topic than the politics of traditional standards bodies, but
there remain few in-depth studies of ICT standards as social
institutions.
While many commentators on the politics of
“cyberspace” have noted that information technology may regulate
human behavior in much the same way laws do,40 and while the
relationship between the work of SDOs and the enforcement of
intellectual property rights has recently become a subject of intense
studying what they like and liking what they study . . . .” Id. It is this author’s opinion that,
presumably, most social scientists do not much like engineers, given that social institutions
dominated by engineers, such as SDOs, are so little studied by social scientists.
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting
Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1891–92 (National Fire Protection Association
2002). Some exceptions exist, however. See, e.g., ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., STANDARDS
DEVELOPMENT IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR: THOUGHTS ON INTEREST REPRESENTATION AND
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 5–8 (1978) (listing fear of underrepresentation of consumers and
small business as well as anticompetitive effects as sources of concern about private
standards making).
39

40 See, e.g., WILLIAM J. MITCHELL, CITY OF BITS: SPACE, PLACE AND THE INFOBAHN 111
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1995) (“Out there on the electronic frontier, code is
the law.”); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy
Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 553–55 (1998); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE
AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (Basic Books 1999); Mitch Kapor’s Blog,
http://blog.kapor.com/?p=29 (April 23, 2006, 10:56 EST).
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controversy,41 there have been few in-depth studies of ICT SDOs as a
source of regulatory norms.42
Although standards are as old as commerce itself,43 demand for
standardization increased sharply in the 19th century, resulting in the
emergence of new institutions for developing responsive standards
more quickly and effectively. Modern technical standards are thus
one by-product of the Industrial Revolution, developed in response to
the need to increase the coordination among large-scale producers of
increasingly complex manufactured products operating in national
and international markets.44 By the mid-20th century, standards and
SDOs had come to play an essential role in the process of regulating
industrial economies.45 In 1979, the importance of regulations
concerning technical standards and conformity assessment
procedures to international trade was given official, but limited,
recognition when the GATT Standards Code was added to GATT
because accession to the Standards Code was optional for GATT
members, and few countries adopted it. When the WTO was
established in 1995, accession to the TBT was made a mandatory part
of WTO membership. The regulatory and economic significance of
technical standards has increased steadily with the growth of
international trade in recent decades.46 As of 2005, some estimates
put the volume of international trade in goods subject to standardrelated measures at eighty percent.47
See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 39; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N,
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION
AND COMPETITION (Apr. 2007), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf.
41

42 But see, e.g., Tineke M. Egyedi & Sebastiano Toffaletti, Standardising Social
Responsibility: Analysing ISO Representation Issues From an SME Perspective, in
PROCEEDINGS 13TH EURAS WORKSHOP ON STANDARDISATION 121–36 (Kai Jakobs & Eva
Soederstroem eds., 2007).
43

ESSENTIALS, supra note 10, at 7.

44 SUZANNE BERGER, HOW WE COMPETE 9–16 (Currency Doubleday 2005); KRISLOV, supra
note 5, at 21–22.
45

KRISLOV, supra note 4, at 49.

46 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, STANDARDS, CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT AND TRADE: INTO
THE 21ST CENTURY 107–08 (National Academy Press 1995).
47 U.S. Dep’t of State, United States Combating Use of Standards as Trade Barriers, May
13, 2005, http://www.america.gov/st/washfileenglish/2005/May/20050513162339ajesroM0.5901605.html; ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. (OECD), STANDARDS AND CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT IN TRADE:
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The onset of the Information Revolution toward the end of the
20th century fueled growth in ICT standards and standard-setting
processes in much the same way that the Industrial Revolution fueled
the growth of product standards in the 19th century. However, the first
global ICT standards organizations had been established much earlier
to facilitate interoperability among local, national, and international
telegraph and telephone networks. In 1865, representatives of 20
countries signed the first International Telegraph Convention; and the
International Telegraph Union was established to facilitate
subsequent amendments to the treaty.48 In 1934, it merged with the
International Radiotelegraph Union to form the ITU; and in 1947, it
became a specialized agency of the United Nations. In furtherance of
its mission to maintain interconnections among domestic telephone
systems, the ITU continues to support the development of ICT
standards and is a leading example of a “de jure” international ICT
standards body. Although ICT standards have played a foundational
role in global integration of markets for more than a century, until
recent decades, they were overshadowed in economic and political
significance by product standards for goods.
In recent decades, a particularly aggressive new form of SDO
emerged from the U.S. standard-developing system which has given
the U.S. system a decisive edge in global regulatory competition to set
ICT standards in global markets. In order to promote private-sector
involvement in standards developing and reduce overlapping research
efforts, the U.S. enacted legislation which removed regulatory
obstacles to the growth of consortia in 1984 with the National
Cooperative Research Act,49 and in 1993 with the National
Cooperative Research and Production Act (“NCRPA”).50 The NCRPA
was originally drafted to encourage research and development by
making it clear that the impact of a joint research and development or
production venture should be assessed under the more liberal “rule of
reason” standard, and provides limited protection from antitrust
MINIMISING BARRIERS AND MAXIMISING BENEFITS 194 (Nov. 2005),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/27/36223999.pdf.
48 Int’l Telecomm. Union (“ITU”), ITU’s History,
http://www.itu.int/aboutitu/overview/history.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2009).
49

National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815.

50 National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-42, 107 Stat.
117. See also, The Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 661 (further extending the provisions of the NCRPA to
standards development organizations).
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liability to standard-developing consortia that follow NCRPA
notification procedures.51
These legislative reforms only exacerbated a fundamental
difference between the basic U.S. approach to standards development
and the approach taken by all other leading developed economies.
The U.S. system of developing standards is decentralized and largely
in the hands of private enterprises. The American National Standards
Institute (“ANSI”) helps to oversee and coordinate the U.S. system of
standards development and represents U.S. SDOs at ISO, the
multilateral international standards organization. Unlike NSBs in
other countries, however, it does not itself develop standards.52
Around 200 U.S. SDOs are “ANSI accredited” which means that they
observe minimum due process standards known as “ANSI Essential
Requirements.”53 One benefit to American SDOs of becoming ANSI
accredited is that it is easier for them to have their standards
submitted to ISO for recognition as international standards. One
drawback is that greater openness and transparency in procedures
may slow down the standard-setting process or make it easier for
uncooperative parties to obstruct their work. While many traditional
U.S. SDOs are ANSI-accredited, non-traditional U.S. SDOs such as
consortia are not ANSI-accredited precisely because such a
commitment to transparency might slow them down or distract their
focus from the immediate goals of their members. Because the U.S.
system relies even more heavily on private-sector initiative than do
the standards systems of other developed economies, U.S. observers
are fond of describing it as a “bottom up” system unlike the “top
down” system favored by other countries. This characterization is
generally rejected by non-U.S. observers, however, who point out that
even outside the U.S., standards setting is normally undertaken in
response to private-sector demand, and the role of NSBs is normally
limited to helping coordinate work undertaken largely by privatesector entities. Whether or not the “top down/bottom up” distinction
is accurate, it is clear that ANSI-accredited SDOs generally operate in
a more decentralized, market-oriented environment than do NSBs in
other developed market economies, and that U.S.-based consortia
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL 11–29 (2008),
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/divisionmanual/atrdivman.pdf.

51

52

Cargill, supra note 8, at 244.

American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”), Introduction to ANSI,
http://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/introduction/introduction.aspx (last visited Apr. 15,
2009).
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operate in an even more decentralized, market-oriented manner than
ANSI-accredited SDOs.
The difference between the U.S. approach to standards developing
and the approach taken by other developed market economies is one
manifestation of a larger difference in regulatory institutions. Political
scientists distinguish between “coordinated market economies”
(“CMEs”) such as Germany or Japan, and “liberal market economies”
(“LMEs”) such as the United States. The distinction is based on the
most common forms of business organizations and the preponderance
of either market or relational institutions.54 One way to characterize
some of the institutional differences this distinction attempts to
capture is that CMEs have favored a “producerist” approach to
economic regulation (which focuses on labor-management relations,
and relations among enterprises), while the U.S. has favored a
“consumerist” approach (which focuses on competition in retail
markets).55 In recent years, some observers have argued that CMEs
favor the precautionary principle more strongly than do LMEs,
although this assertion has been the subject of considerable
controversy.56 Perhaps less controversial is the general observation
that regulatory regimes for managing risk vary from country to
country, and that some societies, which happen to include most LMEs,
adopt a more “individualist” approach to the management of risk,
while other societies, which happen to include many leading CMEs,
take a more “hierarchical” approach to the management of risk.57
With regard to generalizations about differences in LME and CME
approaches to risk, it is clear that the U.S. system of standards
developing, like many other American economic institutions, focuses
on market incentives and tends to externalize many social costs, while
standard-developing systems organized around an NSB place a
greater emphasis on central coordination of economic activity and can
internalize social costs more effectively. Under conditions of global
regulatory competition to set ICT standards, it should hardly be
surprising that ICT SDOs with roots in the U.S. standards system are
54

Hall & Soskice, supra note 13, at 8.

James Q. Whitman, Consumerism versus Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law,
117 YALE L.J. 340, 340 (2007).

55

David Vogel, The Hare and the Tortoise Revisited: The New Politics of Consumer and
Environmental Regulation in Europe, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 557, 557 (2003).

56

CHRISTOPHER HOOD, HENRY ROTHSTEIN & ROBERT BALDWIN, THE GOVERNMENT OF RISK:
UNDERSTANDING RISK REGULATION REGIMES 13 (Oxford University Press 2001).
57
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able to compete more effectively in the struggle to define the emerging
global information architecture than are SDOs with roots in CMEs.
Drafting economic regulations that refer to or incorporate
technical standards can be very difficult. If not done correctly,
references to technical standards can quickly become anachronistic,
contribute to market failures in a myriad of different ways, or
otherwise prove challenging to administer.58 Stephen Breyer noted
that efforts to craft regulations based on technical standards are
plagued with endemic problems, including information asymmetries
between regulators and participants in standard developing processes,
coordination problems, enforcement problems, and anticompetitive
effects.59 While these remain chronic problems for U.S. regulators,
European regulators have developed legislative strategies to reduce
these problems that are well suited to regulation within CMEs.
During the process of building the internal market, the EU
established a framework known as the “New Approach” to
standardization to reduce technical barriers to trade among member
states.60 Before the New Approach, efforts to harmonize technical
standards in the internal market were based on “approximation of
laws,” which required the development of broad, mandatory
standards, and which resulted in political deadlock as member states
fought to block the adoption of standards that might put their
This rigid,
domestic producers at a strategic disadvantage.61
hierarchical approach also created a risk of technological obsolescence
problems due to the delay in adopting harmonized standards and the
difficulty of revising them. The New Approach solved political, legal
and technological problems with the process: once legislation has
been prepared that requires an associated technical standard in order
to be implemented effectively, then an associated European

For example, the copyright status of privately developed standards referenced in state or
local laws is ambiguous under U.S. law. See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l Inc., 293
F.3d 791, 800, 802, 807–08 (5th Cir. 2002).

58

59 STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 109–16 (Harvard University Press
1982).
60 Council Directive 83/189/EEC, 1983 O.J. (L 109) 8 (laying down a procedure for the
provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations), amended by
Council and European Parliament Directive 98/48/EC, 1998 O.J. (L 217) 18.
61

EGAN, supra note 20, at 78–81.
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standardization effort is initiated by one of the EU standards bodies.62
The Commission sends an observer to the standard-developing
process but otherwise the process of developing the technical standard
remains unchanged.63 The resulting standard establishes a “safe
harbor” for regulated entities: compliance with the standard is strictly
voluntary, but proof of conformity with that standard creates a
presumption of compliance with the corresponding law.64 If the
standard becomes outdated, it can be replaced by withdrawing the
first standard and publishing a new standard in the official journal;
but no changes need be made in the text of the directive or by any
member state implementing legislation.65 Although political and
technological challenges remain in the process of harmonizing
product standards to remove barriers to trade in the internal market,
the New Approach is generally regarded as a very successful CME
regulatory strategy.66
The significance of technical barriers to trade and regulatory
competition in the area of ICT standards was clear by the late 1980s,
when the commitment to create what is now known as the GSM
(originally Groupe Spécial Mobile, later Global System for Mobile
communications) network was made by European regulators.67
62 This is the “general reference to standards” formula (renvoi aux norms) statute drafting
technique that was first used in the Low Voltage Directive and is a hallmark of New
Approach legislation. EGAN, supra note 20, at 118.

The relationship between the Commission and ESOs regarding Commission mandates
for the development of technical standards to support New Approach directives, including
payments by the Commission to ESOs, is governed by a memorandum of understanding
and guidelines for cooperation between the Commission and the ESOs. Id. at 124.

63

64 Council Resolution (EC) No 85/C 136/01 of 7 May 1985, O.J. (C 136),3 (“[n]ational
authorities are obliged to recognize that products manufactured in conformity with
harmonized standards (or, provisionally, with national standards) are presumed to
conform to the “essential requirements” established by the Directive. This signifies that
the producer has the choice of not manufacturing in conformity with the standards but that
in this event he has an obligation to prove that his products conform to the essential
requirements of the Directive.”).
65

Id.

66 Jacques Pelkmans, The New Approach to Technical Harmonization and
Standardization, 25 J. COMMON MKT. STUDS. 249, 253, 267 (1987); but see also Andrew
McGee & Stephen Weatherill, The Evolution of the Single Market– Harmonisation or
Liberalisation, 53 MOD. L. REV. 578, 595 (1990) (concluding that the New Approach
provides more access to commercial interests than to consumer interests).

Jacques Pelkmans, The GSM Standard: Explaining a Success Story, 8 J. EUR. PUB. POL.
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 432, 433–35 (2001) [hereinafter The GSM Standard].
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European countries had lagged behind the U.S. in adoption rates for
analog mobile phone service, and there was widespread consensus
that an integrated approach was essential to increase European
adoption rates for digital mobile phone service.68 As a result of many
legal, political, economic, and technical compromises, when the GSM
system was launched, it was an immediate success in Europe and was
quickly adopted in many other countries around the world, becoming
the most successful mobile phone standard in the world.69 By
contrast, U.S. regulators relinquished the role they had played in
coordinating standards for analog mobile telephony and allowed
competition among different standards to emerge with the switch to
digital mobile telephony. The result was a decade of bad service and
high prices for U.S. mobile phone customers as competing service
providers built overlapping incompatible networks in certain areas,
while leaving other areas of the country without coverage.70
At around the same time that the GSM model showed the benefits
of the CME approach to ICT standardization, the emergence of the
Internet showed its shortcomings. The explosive growth of the
Internet that commenced in the late 1980s began around the same
time that informal ICT SDOs emerged within the U.S. standards
system. Internet Engineering Task Force (“IETF”) is an informal
private SDO that has sponsored the development of many essential
Internet standards since its founding in 1986.71 At that time, IETF
took over management of the Internet Protocol Suite,72 which had
been developed in 1981 by the U.S. Department of Defense. It now
coordinates the work of hundreds of working groups developing
68 Sandor Bakalis, Muriel Abeln & Enid Mante, The Adoption and Use of Mobile Telephony
in Europe, in COMMUNICATIONS ON THE MOVE: THE EXPERIENCE OF MOBILE TELEPHONY IN
THE 1990S (Leslie Haddon ed., 1997), available at
http://www.cost269.org/Cost248/2_ADOPT.doc.
69 Global GSM Subscriber Growth Rate to Slow in 2008, CELLULAR-NEWS, Apr. 7, 2008,
http://www.cellular-news.com/story/30361.php?source=newsletter.
70

Pelkmans, The GSM Standard, supra note 67, at 448.

Kaushik Das, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), IPV6.COM,
http://www.ipv6.com/articles/organizations/IETF-History-IPv6.htm (last visited Apr. 15,
2009).

71

The Internet Protocol Suite is based on the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet
Protocol (TCP/IP) standard, defined in INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE, UNIVERSITY OF
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, TRANSMISSION CONTROL PROTOCOL: DARPA INTERNET PROGRAM
PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION (1981), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc793.txt.
72
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various standards in some way related to the Internet Protocol Suite.
While the IETF is clearly an informal ICT SDO because it lacks the
kind of de jure mandate that ISO or ITU have, it is more of a “forum”
than a “consortium” because of the large scale of participation in its
projects and the openness of its processes. Although processes at the
highest levels of IETF management may be somewhat opaque,
standard-developing processes carried out by working groups are
generally very open and transparent, and represent the collaborative
efforts of thousands of volunteers from around the world. In 1994, the
World Wide Web Consortium (“W3C”) was established at MIT under
the leadership of Tim Berners-Lee and, like the IETF, is now a leading
global ICT standards forum responsible for the development of many
Internet standards. Like the IETF, activities of W3C working groups
are open, transparent and involve thousands of individuals around the
world.73
The Internet Protocol Suite and the work of the IETF completely
eclipsed a much more formal effort established in 1981 by ISO and the
ITU to create a global ICT networking standard known as “Open
Systems Interconnection” (“OSI”).74 During the 1980s, the IETF was
still a relatively small, collegial organization, while the OSI effort was
carried out on a large scale with formal procedures. As a result, the
Internet Protocol Suite was already in widespread use by the time the
OSI standards were finished. The OSI effort was more politicized than
the IETF because its work was carried out by dozens of NSBs
competing for tactical advantages rather than a handful of engineers.
As a result, many of the design decisions in the final OSI standard are
problematic from a technological perspective, having been adopted to
resolve political conflicts. While the OSI standards were more
comprehensive than the IETF standards, addressing in depth issues
such as security that were given short shrift when IETF standards
were developed and achieved global adoption, they were also much
more complex and difficult to implement.75 The dominance of IETF
and W3C in Internet standards arenas represents the triumph of
informal ICT standards forums with roots in the U.S. standards
system at the expense of formal de jure international ICT standards

73 Internet Engineering Task Force, Wikipedia entry, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IETF;
World Wide Web Consortium, Wikipedia entry, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W3c.
74

ANDREW S. TANENBAUM, COMPUTER NETWORKS 46 (4th ed. Prentice Hall PTR 2003).

75

Id. at 46–48.
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bodies like the ITU with stronger ties to European standards
systems.76
In the decades following the global adoption of the GSM standard
and the Internet Protocol Suite, the EU has not enjoyed any successes
of the magnitude of the GSM in the global regulatory competition to
establish ICT standards. For example, the EU chose to regulate online
authentication systems with the 1999 Electronic Signature Directive,
while the U.S. chose to let market forces determine the appropriate
authentication technology and degree of standardization rather than
regulate commercial practice in this area. 77 In the 2000s, these EU
efforts have led regulators and EU businesses up a blind alley as they
try to implement digital signature and public key infrastructure
systems that failed to achieve market acceptance in the 1990s. Less
regulated markets in the U.S. have developed a new approach known
as “federated identity management” to deal with authentication
problems. Informal ICT SDOs have produced new standards to
promote the adoption of federated identity management systems,
such as the Security Assertion Markup Language (“SAML”)78 and
OpenID,79 which are rapidly gaining acceptance in global markets.80
While these new U.S. standards have yet to enjoy the same degree of
success that the Internet did relative to the OSI framework, they are
nevertheless enjoying more success in global markets than are EU
efforts to mandate a particular approach to strong authentication
technologies.81
76

FITZPATRICK, SWEDISH ICT COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN ICT STANDARDS, supra note 16.

77 Jane K. Winn, U.S. and EU Regulatory Competition and Authentication Standards in
Electronic Commerce, 5 INT’L J. IT STANDARDS & STANDARDIZATION RES. 84, 84 (2007).
78 Id. (SAML is an XML standard for exchanging authentication and authorization data
between security domains). See generally Security Assertion Markup Language, Cover
Pages, http://xml.coverpages.org/saml.html (last visited May 23, 2009).

OpenID is a decentralized, user-centric single-sign on authentication system for the
Internet. See generally What is OpenID?, OpenID, http://openid.net/what/ (last visited
May 23, 2009).

79

80

Winn, supra note 77, at 93.

81 In 2007, a study undertaken for Commission DG Information Society identified many
problems related to the Electronic Signature Directive which were contributing to lack of
adoption of the technology in Europe. See SEALED, DLA Paper, and Across
Communications, STUDY ON THE STANDARDISATION ASPECTS OF ESIGNATURE, (2007),
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/i2010/docs/esignatures/e_signatures_
standardisation.pdf. In 2009, the Commission DG Taxation and Customs called for the
elimination of electronic signature requirements from e-invoicing regulations, citing them
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In 2008, the European Commission initiated a public debate on
the disadvantages suffered by ICT SDOs rooted in CMEs in the
competition to set global ICT standards, and to identify strategies for
changing the terms of global regulatory competition to set ICT
standards.82 The simplest solution—to grant legal recognition as
“European Standards” to any standards developed by de facto private
consortia that appear to meet the needs of European consumers and
producers—is not politically viable. The Commission has been
working with ESOs for many years to try to develop new standards
processes that are politically viable within Europe and that produce
ICT standards that are economically viable outside Europe, but these
efforts have yet to produce any successes of the magnitude of GSM.
The Commission’s new initiative was designed to identify a middle
ground: increase the scope of the dialogue between EU regulators and
informal ICT standards consortia while also working for modest
reforms in European standards institutions to permit them to respond
more effectively to global market demands. Deliberative processes
within the Commission started in 2008,83 but it may take years before
reforms are made as a result of those deliberations.

III. CHANGING THE LOGIC OF TWO-LEVEL GAMES
The growth of informal de jure ICT SDOs at the expense of formal
de jure ICT SDOs is yet another manifestation of the “real new world
order” dominated by networks of informal institutions in lieu of
hierarchical multilateral institutions.84 The real challenge facing
regulators outside the U.S. opposed to their growing influence is
therefore not to stop the adoption of consortia standards, but to
ensure that their adoption serves the same interests that were served
by the work of traditional SDOs. In order to accomplish this, changes
as a major barrier to the adoption of e-invoicing by European businesses. See, Press
Release, Europa, VAT: Commission Proposes a Review of the VAT Rules on invoicing with
a View to Reduce Burdens on Business and to Help Member States Tackle Fraud
(Jan. 28, 2009), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/132.
DG ENTERPRISE, EUROPEAN ICT STANDARDISATION POLICY AT A CROSSROADS: A NEW
DIRECTION FOR GLOBAL SUCCESS 2 (2008),
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/ict/policy/standards/cf2008/080206-dispaper.pdf
[hereinafter THE WAY FORWARD].
82

83

Id.
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Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183, 184 (1997).
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will be required in the governance framework within which consortia
operate. One of the lessons of the “new governance” is the importance
of matching the right regulatory instrument with whatever challenge
is under consideration. Furthermore, a dynamic strategy of changing
regulatory instruments in light of circumstances may also be
necessary to increase the effectiveness of regulation. For example,
Ayres and Braithwaite have argued that in many regulatory
environments, a “pyramid of regulatory strategies” is likely to be the
most effective approach.85 The base of the pyramid is informal
enforcement strategies which can be replaced with increasingly
punitive enforcement strategies in response to manifestations of
disregard for less punitive efforts.
While traditional product
standards may be soft law if voluntary, or hard law if made mandatory
by incorporation into or reference from legislation,86 when the
adoption of ICT standards is driven by strong network effects, the
regulatory effect of those standards may exceed that of even “hard”
law.87 This technologically enhanced hard mandate is directly at odds
with the idea of calibrating enforcement mechanisms based on risk
and the potential for collaborative outcomes. While an ICT standards
“mandate” enforced by strong network effects may be perceived as
legitimate in some LME national political systems, it may be opposed
as illegitimate in others, such as CME systems, especially if it impedes
compliance with national social regulations such as privacy laws.
The most obvious way to minimize ex post political resistance to
such ICT standards mandates would be to increase ex ante
collaboration among countries in the development of standards before
they are widely adopted. While this was successful in the case of GSM,
it has proven difficult to reproduce that success. The challenge
currently facing ICT SDOs based in Europe is that, under conditions
of trade liberalization, products can be sold directly to European
IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 39 (Oxford University Press 1992).
85

86 John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock, Introduction: Hard Choices, and Soft Law in
Sustainable Global Governance, in HARD CHOICES, SOFT LAW: VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN
GLOBAL TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 8–10 (John J. Kirton & Michael J.
Trebilcock eds., Ashgate 2004). Soft law consists of rules which are neither strictly binding
nor completely void of any legal significance; with time these may “harden” into customary
international law. See generally, MARK WESTON JANIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (5th ed.
2008).

Jane K. Winn, Standard Developing Organizations as a Form of Self-Regulation, in
THE STANDARDS EDGE: STANDARDIZATION: UNIFIER OR DIVIDER (Sherrie Bolin ed., The
Bolin Group forthcoming 2009).
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producers and consumers that incorporate consortia-based standards,
resulting in ad hoc recognition of de facto standards before de jure
standards can be completed. Under conditions of trade liberalization,
it would be difficult as a practical matter and politically controversial
for EU regulators to block access in local markets to products based
on consortia standards.88 Borrowing from Hirschman, the EU system
of developing ICT standards relies on the milder discipline imposed by
systems of “voice” accountability enforced by long-term political
processes, while the U.S. system of developing ICT standards relies on
the harsher discipline of “exit” accountability enforced by markets.89
Another option for EU regulators might be to shift from a “voice”
system based on direct participation of interested parties in the
process of standards developing to a system based on a modified form
of “exit” (perhaps more properly called “entrance”) after they have
been developed. In this context, however, CME regulators might offer
to consortia formal ex post ratification of their standards under
certain conditions that have been clearly specified in advance. While
the EU has well-developed mechanisms, such as the “New Approach”
to harmonizing legislation with product standards developed by de
jure EU SDOs, there are not yet well-developed mechanisms to permit
formal legal recognition of ICT standards that have been developed by
de facto ICT SDOs outside of the EU system of de jure ESOs.90 In its
2008 consultation, the Commission suggested that a reform of EU law
to permit such ex post recognition might be appropriate, or even

88 The WTO recognizes certain general exceptions to the duty to obligation permit trade
with other members in WTO Agreement Article XX which inter alia provides: “Subject to
the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting
party of measures: . . . (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; . . . (d)
necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with
the provisions of this Agreement . . . [and] (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption; . . .” Objections to free trade in “smart” goods that
embody consortia standards rather than de jure standards would not be covered by any
WTO exceptions. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/issu4_e.htm#gatt20.

See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES 3–5 (Harvard University Press 1970).
89

90

THE WAY FORWARD, supra note 82.
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necessary, to achieve EU policy objectives in ICT arenas.91 Given the
often intense competition among de facto SDOs to achieve a critical
mass of adoptions for their standards, articulating the conditions for
ex post ratification might create powerful incentives to some consortia
to increase the transparency and accountability of their processes ex
ante.
National and international processes for insuring the transparency
and accountability of de facto ICT SDOs are generally much less
developed than similar processes for conventional product
standards.92 Consortia have emerged as major players in standards
arenas very recently, operating largely in economic arenas dominated
by the U.S. at the same time that U.S. political institutions were
generally enamored with deregulation and opposed to regulation.
Liberalization of national telecommunications and product markets
ushered in by the WTO has made it possible for a handful of ICT
product developers to form consortia, develop and implement ICT
product standards and market finished products to end users around
the world without reference to the formal international standards
bodies. As a result, consortia are often able to evade oversight within
the conventional international standards framework developed since
WWII and centered on ISO, ITU and IEC.
Within the system of de jure international standards, the
possibility of recognition as a de jure international standard
recognized by ISO and distributed throughout the world might once
have provided strong incentives to stay within the de jure system. The
success of IETF and W3C in setting global Internet standards without
the imprimatur of ISO, ITU or IEC has undermined those incentives.
In the de jure international standards systems, recognized NSBs may
submit national standards to ISO for adoption as international
standards.93 For example, the ISO 9000 standard, first issued by ISO
in 1987 and subsequently updated several times, began life in 1979 as
BS 5750 issued by BSI, the British NSB formerly known as the British
Institute. In the U.S., standards developed by ANSI Accredited SDOs
may be designated as “American Standards” and sent on to ISO for
consideration as international standards.
The possibility of
recognition by ISO at some point in the future is too weak an incentive

91

Id.

92

Updegrove, supra note 17.

93 ISO/IEC DIRECTIVES, PART 1: PROCEDURES FOR THE TECHNICAL WORK 62 (2008),
http://www.iec.ch/tiss/iec/Directives-Part1-Ed6.pdf.
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to bring any ICT standards consortia to see ANSI certification.
Successful consortia target end users in global markets directly in
order to achieve de facto market-based recognition, disregarding de
jure politically based recognition procedures administered by ISO.
The recent controversy in the EU surrounding the widespread
adoption of radio frequency identifier (“RFID”) technology illustrates
how market acceptance of de facto ICT standards can pose problems
for regulators limited to working with formal ICT SDOs, as well as
suggesting what a possible solution’s features might include. RFID
technology permits automatic identification and data capture by
means of radio communications. RFID systems include a tag that can
receive radio signals and that can store, and possibly even process,
information; a reader that transmits and detects radio waves returned
from tags; and a system for collecting data. World War II pilots used
the earliest predecessor to modern RFID system to help their ground
crews detect whether an incoming plane was a “friend or foe.”94 Work
began on the first RFID standard relevant to current mass-market
applications in the ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee 1/SC 31 in
1997.95 In 1999, the Uniform Code Council,96 EAN International,97
Proctor & Gamble, and Gillette provided funding to the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology to establish the Auto-ID Center, which
developed the network communications model currently in use in
Since then, many major
mass-market RFID applications.98
multinational corporations have worked to develop a wide range of
commercial applications for this technology. During the 2000s, RFID
tags came into widespread use in certain sectors.99 GS1, the successor

94 The History of RFID Technology, RFID Journal,
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/view/1338/1/129 (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).
95

GRIFS, supra note 22, at 110.

96 The Uniform Code Council was in charge of standards for “universal product code” bar
codes in the U.S. See GS1 US, ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2005),
http://www.gs1us.org/pdf/Annual_Report2005.pdf. In 2005, it changed its name to GS1
US. Id. at 7.

European Article Numbering (“EAN”) International was in charge of standards for
“universal product code” bar codes in Europe. In 2005, it changed its name to GS1. EAN
INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL REPORT 2003/2004 8 (2003/2004),
http://www.gs1.org/docs/publications/annual_report/annual_report_2003_2004.pdf.
97

98

The History of RFID Technology, supra note 94.
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to the Uniform Code Council and EAN International, emerged as the
most
important
international
RFID
standard-developing
organization.100 GS1 is a standard-developing consortium, and its
members include business enterprises from around the world.101 In
2003, GS1 together with GS1 U.S. formed EPCglobal, a global
membership organization that works to promote the adoption of
“electronic product codes” and RFID technology.102 EPCglobal
develops standards, provides conformity certification for products,
accredits other organizations to provide conformity testing, and
provides training, marketing and political advocacy for RFID products
and services.103 Due in part to the promotional efforts of SDOs and
trade associations such as EPCglobal, adoption rates for RFID
technologies were increasing in the U.S. and in Europe.104
Although concern among privacy advocates about potentially
invasive uses of RFID technology had been expressed since the early
2000s,105 the controversy surrounding privacy and security issues
created by unregulated commercial RFID applications escalated
dramatically when Vivian Reding, Commissioner for Information

99 K.C. Jones, Interest Increasing in RFID Applications, Survey Shows, INFO. WK.,
Aug. 7, 2008,
www.informationweek.com/news/mobility/RFID/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=20990439
7.

Wikipedia, European Article Number-Uniform Code Council,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Article_Numbering-Uniform_Code_Council (last
visited Apr.15, 2009).

100

101

Wikipedia, GS1, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GS1 (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).

102 GS1, Timeline, http://www.gs1.org/about/media_centre/timeline.html (last visited Apr.
15, 2009).
103 GS1, Overview About EPC Global,
http://www.gs1.org/productssolutions/epcglobal/overview.html (last visited Apr. 15,
2009).

See generally EPCGLOBAL RESPONSE TO EU RFID ONLINE CONSULTATION (2006),
http://www.rfidconsultation.eu/docs/ficheiros/EPCglobal_Response_to_EU_RFID_Onli
ne_Consultation.pdf

104

105 See generally Electronic Privacy Information Center, Radio Frequency Identification
(RFID) System, May 13, 2009, http://epic.org/privacy/rfid/ (listing privacy concerns such
as invasive profiling of consumer preferences through undisclosed, nonconsensual
monitoring of consumer behavior).
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Society, launched a public consultation in 2006.106 The public
consultation was intended to establish global standards for RFID
technology and insure their compliance with EU data protection laws.
A Commission Communication followed this in 2007 articulating the
twin EU goals of harnessing RFID as a tool to promote innovation and
growth as well as insuring that its use complies with EU law.107 In
2008, work began on several projects designed to help coordinate the
EU response to RFID developments and contribute to the
development of EU-compliant RFID technologies, including
Coordination and Support Action for Global RFID-Related Activities
and Standardisation (“CASAGRAS”), the Global RFID Interoperability
Forum for Standards (“GRIFS”), and the Cluster for European RFID
Projects (“CERP”), all of which received major funding through the
Seventh Framework Programme, the EU’s primary program for
funding scientific research.108
Although the EU response to regulatory challenges created by
rapid adoption of RFID technology has been multifaceted and broad,
it has also tended to proceed on bureaucratic time rather than
Internet time. As of the time of this essay’s publication, it is too soon
to know what impact EU efforts to change the institutional framework
within which RFID products and standards are developed and used
will have in global markets. In order to overcome the “privacy
invasive” character of RFID standards developed in industrydominated consortia over the last decade with little input from end
users or regulators, significant changes in the design of commercial
RFID systems will be needed. In response to the 2007 Commission
Communication, Peter Hustinx, the European Data Protection
Supervisor (“EDPS”), issued an opinion in 2008 arguing that not
enough was being done to ensure that RFID applications were
How the Debate Started, Europe’s Information Society,
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/rfid/eu_approach/how_started/index_e
n.htm (last visited Apr.15, 2009) (explaining how the European Commissioner for
Information Society and Media launched a public debate on RFID at a 2006 technology
conference).

106

107 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Radio
Frequency Identification (RFID) in Europe: Steps Toward a Policy Framework, at 3 COM
(2007) 96 final (Mar. 15, 2007), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2007/com2007_0096en01.pdf.

Press Release, European Commission, A New Vision for the Internet, (Dec. 23, 2008),
available at
http://cordis.europa.eu/fetch?CALLER=FP7_NEWS&ACTION=D&RCN=30283.
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deployed in a manner that respected the privacy rights of EU
citizens.109 In this opinion, Hustinx noted the need for clearer
guidance on how to apply the current legal framework to the RFID
environment and for new EU legislation to regulate RFID use.110 In
addition, Hustinx also argued that Article 3(3)(c) of the Radio and
Telecommunications Terminal Equipment Directive (which requires
certain equipment classes or apparatus of particular types shall be so
constructed that they incorporate safeguards to ensure that the
personal data and privacy of the user and of the subscriber are
protected) had not yet been used to require RFID technologies to
provide data protection protections, but might support such a
requirement.111 In addition, he argued for recognition of the “opt-in”
principle for collection of personally identifiable information by
means of RFID technology, and the identification of “Best Available
Techniques” which would support the privacy-by-design principle.112
However, a 2008 report issued by GRIFS on the “state of the art” of
RFID standards noted, “There have been a number of proposals,
particularly from an academic base, to introduce privacy enhancing
technologies (“PETs”) to RFID technologies. Few, almost none, of
such PETs are so far present in the devices and air interface protocol
standards.”113
Although EU efforts to harness RFID technology to serve
economic goals while also complying with EU regulation may
ultimately fail (just as OSI failed after the simpler TCP/IP protocol
was introduced)114 such an outcome is far from certain. These efforts
109 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions on ‘Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
in Europe: Steps Towards a Policy Framework’, 2008 O.J.
(C 101) 1, 2 [hereinafter RFID in Europe: Steps Towards a Policy Framework], available
at
http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consult
ation/Opinions/2007/07-12-20_RFID_EN.pdf.
110

Id.

111 See RFID in Europe: Steps Towards a Policy Framework supra note 109, at ¶59 (citing
Directive 1999/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of Mar. 9, 1999, on
radio equipment and telecommunications terminal equipment and the mutual recognition
of their conformity, O.J. L 91/10 (Mar. 9, 1999)).
112

Id.

113

GRIFS, supra note 22, at 113.

114

ANDREW S. TANENBAUM, COMPUTER NETWORKS 46 (4th ed. Prentice Hall PTR 2003).
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may instead contribute to outcomes perceived as positive in both
LMEs and CMEs, meeting Putnam’s standard for winning both levels
of two-level games. The GRIFS survey of the “state of the art” of RFID
technology was undertaken jointly by GRIFS, a special purpose policy
research vehicle funded by the Commission on a temporary basis,
ETSI, the European telecommunications standards agency, and GS1,
the private consortia responsible for leading the development of many
commercial RFID standards currently in use.115 Formal cooperation
on global benchmarking efforts by ETSI, a de jure ESO, and GS1, a
major global consortium that is not ANSI-accredited, and thus lacks
de jure status under EU standards law and policy, is not
unprecedented. The ICT Standards Board was established in 1995 by
CEN, CENELEC and ETSI to expand the scope of dialogue among de
jure ESOs and de facto ICT SDOs.116
The EU Commission has suggested that moving from informal
coordination among politically based de jure and market-based de
facto international ICT SDOs to formal legal recognition should be
based on the criteria developed by the WTO with reference to the Code
of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of
Standards contained in Annex 3 to the WTO Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade.117 These principles have been restated in the
following terms:
A standard may be used in association with EU
legislation and policies when the following attributes
have been taken into account during the technical
consensus-building phase as well as in the subsequent
formal acceptance process:
1. Openness:
Standards will be developed and
maintained by a non-profit making organisation.
Ongoing development will occur on the basis of an
open decision making process accessible to all
interested parties. An open standardisation process
115GRIFS,

supra note 22, at 113.

116 ICT Standards Boards, About, http://www.ictsb.org/About/ToR.htm (last visited May
30, 2009).

Patrick Van Eecke & Maarten Truyens, Standardisation in the European ICT Sector:
Official Procedures at the Verge of Being Overhauled, SHIDLER J. L. COMM. & TECH.
(forthcoming 2009).
117
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will be driven by the relevant categories of stakeholders
and reflect user requirements;
2. Consensus:
The standard making process is a
collaborative and consensus based activity.
The
process will not favour any particular category of
stakeholder;
3. Balance:
The standardisation process should be
accessible, at any stage of the development and
decision making process, on a non-discriminatory basis
to relevant stakeholders and the participation of all
interested categories of stakeholders will be sought
with a view to achieving balance;
4. Transparency:
The process is accessible to all
interested parties and all information concerning
technical discussions and the decision making process
is archived and identified. Information on (new)
standardisation activities is widely announced through
suitable and accessible means. Consideration and
response will be given to comments by interested
parties;
5. Maintenance: Ongoing support and maintenance over
a long period is guaranteed;
6. Availability:
Standards are publicly available for
implementation and use at reasonable terms (including
for reasonable fee or free of charge);
7. Intellectual Property Rights: IPRs essential to the
implementation of standards will be licensed to
applicants
on
a
(fair)
reasonable
and
nondiscriminatory basis (F)RAND, which may permit,
at the discretion of the IPR holder, licensing essential
IPR without compensation. However, Royalty free
(“RF”) IPR cannot be imposed by the Commission or a
public procurement authority;
8. Relevance:
The standard shall be effective and
relevant: standards need to respond to market needs
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and regulatory requirements, especially when these
requirements are expressed in mandates;
9. Neutrality and stability: Standards should whenever
possible, be performance-oriented rather than based on
design or descriptive characteristics. They should not
distort the (global) market, and should maintain the
capacity for implementers to develop competition and
innovation based upon them. Additionally and in order
to enhance their stability, standards should be based on
advanced scientific and technological developments.
10. Quality: The quality and level of detail are sufficient to
permit the development of a variety of competing
implementations of interoperable products and
services. Standardised interfaces are not hidden or
controlled by anyone other than the standards setting
organisation.118
The Commission has asked for feedback on the idea that reference
might be made to de facto standards that comply with these principles
in EU legislation.119 The possibility of EU funding for collaborative
activities involving de facto and de jure ICT SDOs and the high profile
given to RFID-related privacy and data security issues may also
provide strong incentives for private consortia such as GS1 to focus on
transparency, accountability and regulatory compliance as well as the
short-term commercial objectives of consortia members.
To the extent that EU regulatory policies are more representative
of regulatory policies in most other developed and developing
economies than the more market-oriented policies characteristic of
LMEs such as the U.S., then the EU may be able to create strong
economic incentives for informal global ICT SDOs to comply
voluntarily with WTO standard developing principles. Because
consortia lack de jure authority to engage in standard developing, they
must continually struggle to justify their existence in terms of market
118 Decisions and Recommendations Adopted by the Committee Since 1 January 1995,
G/TBT/1/Rev.8, 23 May 2002, Section IX (Decision of the Committee on Principles for the
Development of International Standards, Guides and Recommendations with relation to
Articles 2, 5 and Annex 3 of the Agreement), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt_e.htm#annexIII.
119
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adoption of the standards they produce. The proliferation in recent
years of ICT consortia, and the absence of any regulatory framework
other than antitrust law governing their activities in the U.S.,
contributes to wasteful competition among ICT SDOs.120 If EU
regulators can articulate clear criteria for the recognition of standards
developed by ICT consortia, then consortia may begin to compete for
EU recognition as a way to distinguish themselves and their products
in crowded global markets. To the extent that consortia are able to
combine responsiveness to market conditions with increased
compliance with WTO standard developing principles, then the
likelihood of “winner takes all” victories in global markets for ICT
standards incompatible with CME regulatory goals would be reduced.

IV. CONCLUSION
Under certain circumstances, ICT standards may regulate human
behavior in a manner similar to that of more traditional legal
institutions. With the emergence of global ICT networks, the ICT
standards that define the architecture of those networks have the
potential to regulate behavior in many different countries
simultaneously. In recent decades, informal ICT SDOs with roots in
the U.S. system of standards developing have dominated the process
of developing and implementing ICT standards. In the U.S., the
legitimacy of the activities of SDOs, formal or informal, is generally
perceived to be a function of resulting standards’ responsiveness to
market conditions. Outside the U.S., the nature of the formal legal
mandate to an SDO is generally perceived as pivotal in assessing the
legitimacy of its work. In many areas, the work of informal ICT
standards consortia and fora has eclipsed the work of more traditional
international ICT standards organizations with clear formal de jure
mandates from multilateral organizations or member countries.
Technology companies with roots in the U.S. economy tend to
dominate the work of ICT consortia, and often are rewarded well for
their efforts in terms of market adoption of technologies they have
developed or control. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the
dominance in global markets of ICT standards produced by informal
consortia is perceived in a positive light by most U.S. observers while
it is regarded as a threat to politically legitimate standard-developing
processes by many observers outside the U.S.
Andrew Updegrove, Standards Wars: Situations, Strategies and Outcomes,
CONSORTIUMINFO.ORG (Consortium Standards Bulletin, Boston, Mass.), Mar. 2006, at 1,
available at http://consortiuminfo.org/bulletins/pdf/mar06/feature.pdf.
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Applying Putnam’s two-level game metaphor to the political
economy of ICT standards development in national and international
markets, ICT standards processes that are perceived as legitimate
within CMEs and LMEs often differ significantly. Under conditions of
global trade liberalization, when strong network effects influence end
user product choices, aggregation in global markets of individual end
user choices may lead to widespread adoption of ICT standards that
are incompatible with law and social values in CMEs. In order for
global ICT standards to be recognized as politically legitimate and to
achieve widespread market adoptions in both LMEs and CMEs, some
form of coordination between the two systems of standards
developing is needed. Given the practical difficulties of mandating
greater transparency and accountability ex ante by ICT standards
consortia, it may be more practical for CMEs to offer ex post
recognition on a selective basis to leverage the interest of consortia in
achieving the widest possible adoption of the standards they produce.
By integrating both the market accountability of consortia and the
political legitimacy of de jure ICT SDOs, it would be possible to win on
both levels of the two-level game.

